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Abstract: Several Canadian and international scholars offer commentaries on the 
implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for governments and public service insti-
tutions, and fruitful directions for public administration research and practice. This 
first suite of commentaries focuses on the executive branch, variously considering: 
the challenge for governments to balance demands for accountability and learning 
while rethinking policy mixes as social solidarity and expert knowledge increas-
ingly get challenged; how the policy-advisory systems of Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and United Kingdom were structured and performed in response to the 
COVID-19 crisis; whether there are better ways to suspend the accountability reper-
toires of Parliamentary systems than the multiparty agreement struck by the minor-
ity Liberal government with several opposition parties; comparing the Canadian 
government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Global Financial Crisis 
and how each has brought the challenge of inequality to the fore; and whether the 
COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated or disrupted digital government initiatives, 
reinforced traditional public administration values or more open government.
Sommaire : Plusieurs universitaires canadiens et internationaux ont offert des 
commentaires sur les implications de la pandémie du COVID-19 pour les gou-
vernements et les institutions de la fonction publique, ainsi que des orientations 
productives pour la recherche et la pratique en administration publique. Cette pre-
mière série de commentaires se concentre sur le pouvoir exécutif, en considérant 
de diverses façons : le défi pour les gouvernements d’équilibrer les exigences de 
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alors que la solidarité sociale et les connaissances d’experts sont de plus en plus 
remises en question; comment les systèmes de consultation en politique de l’Aus-
tralie, du Canada, de la Nouvelle-Zélande et du Royaume-Uni ont été structurés 
et mis en œuvre en réponse à la crise du COVID-19; s’il existe de meilleures façons 
de suspendre les répertoires de responsabilité des systèmes parlementaires que 
l’accord multipartite conclu par le gouvernement libéral minoritaire avec plusieurs 
partis d’opposition; comparer la réponse du gouvernement canadien à la pandémie 
du COVID-19 et à la crise financière mondiale et comment chacune a mis le défi de 
l’inégalité au premier plan; et si la pandémie du COVID-19 a accéléré ou perturbé 
les initiatives du gouvernement numérique, renforcé les valeurs traditionnelles de 
l’administration publique ou un gouvernement plus transparent.
Shaping the long shadows of COVID-19: 
three challenges for governments
Arjen Boin and Paul ’t Hart
Frantic mobilization efforts in the health sector, clear crisis communication 
and a remarkable degree of rule adherence have brought back a measure 
of government control – though of an inherently tenuous kind – over the 
course of events in the biggest crisis to hit the Netherlands since World War 
II. The infection curve, which began so badly, has been flattened. Yet still, at 
least six thousand Dutch citizens died of COVID-19 during the first three 
months of the outbreak, and many more have only barely survived after 
protracted and debilitating IC treatment. The economy has taken a serious 
hit, even though it is not yet clear how deep the damage will run (massive 
government outlays are still offsetting the worst of the financial impact on 
firms and households). The flow-on social devastation – including exacer-
bated pre-existing social inequalities – that may result from a prolonged re-
cession is beginning to manifest itself.
But there are also grounds for satisfaction. We have seen an outpouring 
of social solidarity and self-help initiatives. The high level of compliance 
with the restrictions imposed surprised the experts. The general public has 
gained a new sense of appreciation for the front-line heroes in cure and care 
systems, but also in supermarkets, public transport and local government 
administrations. It is no surprise, then, that the national government and its 
leader, veteran Prime Minister Mark Rutte, concluded the “first wave” with 
high levels of public support.
As always, the question is how long this will last. The strong national 
consensus quickly proved tenuous. As soon as the crisis entered our rear-
view mirror, the nibbling at its edges began. Poignant questions emerged. 
Parliamentarians found their voice again. Why did the spread of the virus 
come as a surprise? How did we miss the nursing homes where so many 
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elderly died? Why did we not stockpile critical medical supplies? Why have 
we allowed our health system to become so lean and efficient that we lacked 
the redundancies in IC capacity – essential for any large-scale disaster? Why 
did it take such a long time to ramp up testing capacity? Why were national 
leaders and experts so adamantly opposed to the general use of face masks? 
Were all those measures really necessary? Could the government not have 
relaxed measures a bit sooner? Last, but not least: who will foot the bill?
None of this should come as a surprise. This type of instant revisionism 
happens after pretty much every crisis or disaster. The “altruistic commu-
nity” and the broad consensus to “take the politics out of this” that typically 
prevail during the early crisis stages are shattered and superseded by a grim-
mer climate of frustration, recrimination, politicization and legal maneuver-
ing once the most urgent threat phase is over and the “recovery” is supposed 
to begin (Kaniasty and Norris 2004). As we leave COVID-19 behind us, few 
countries will manage to circumvent this iron law of crisis dynamics.
From solidarity and compliance to 
frustration and accountability
There undoubtedly will be local variations in how things turn ugly. Much 
will depend upon “the numbers.” Countries like New Zealand, Australia, 
Japan and Thailand appear to have avoided mass casualties whereas Brazil, 
the US, Spain and France are among the ones that have seen staggering 
death tolls. Levels of disenchantment will also depend on the severity and 
duration of the economic recessions that countries experience. Some welfare 
states may eventually crumble under the weight of fiscal austerity measures 
taken to compensate for massive drops of tax revenues and to service bal-
looning government debts.
But victimization stats alone cannot predict the nature of the emotional 
cocktail that will emerge in the coming months and – quite possibly – years, 
and the forms in which it will find expression. Culturally contingent atti-
tudes to risk, loss and institutional failure weigh into the narratives that will 
be told about this catastrophe – particularly stories about how and why it 
happened, who should be held responsible, and what sanctions and mea-
sures should be taken (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Bovens and ’t Hart 
1996; Green 1997). There is no telling if and how loss of trust in public and 
political institutions will translate into some degree of social “anomie” 
(non-compliance, resistance, violent unrest, crime, domestic violence). 
Especially countries that did not manage to crush the curve or will see a sec-
ond wave – and not just localized “spikes” – may face a prolonged imbroglio 
(Frailing and Wood Harper 2017).
This much is certain: all those governments that worked with utter dedi-
cation, at breakneck speed, and often with remarkable seamlessness across 
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jurisdictions and sectors to combat the spread of the virus and curb its so-
cio-economic impacts, now face a very different set of critical challenges. For 
the purpose of brevity, we focus on three (cf. Boin et al. 2016):
- The challenge of reassessment: recalibrating the policy mix in light of the 
changing morphology of the crisis: making calls about which measures 
to retain, relax or discard. This creates a new challenge: how to motivate 
workers, citizens, and communities to respect the new regime.
- The challenge of accountability: opening up the books and initiating a na-
tional conversation about what was known and not known, done and not 
done, when, why and by whom, in relation to COVID-19.
- The challenge of learning: reconstructing, interrogating and reflecting 
upon one’s own and other governments’ responses with a view to draw-
ing lessons designed to boost future pandemic (or more generic, mega- 
crisis) prevention, preparedness, response and resilience capacities.
Reassessing the policy mix: what role for 
expert knowledge?
COVID-19 has proved a deep challenge for nearly all policy sectors. The 
reigning policy paradigms, the institutionalized policy instruments, the way 
policies are made, the role of experts in their policy processes – the Search 
for the Exit Strategy put all these to the test. Without evidence-based insights 
and a quick way to secure these insights, policymakers had to come up with 
an approach that balanced economic considerations with public health con-
cerns. How policymakers negotiated this conundrum should be an object of 
study for public administration research.
This will mean a renewed focus on the role of experts in supporting cri-
sis managers (Rosenthal and ‘t Hart [1991] offer a foundational discussion). 
Much research has focused on the perennial gap between theory and policy, 
answering the question why policymakers systematically ignore solid re-
search findings. Though most public administration researchers may lament 
it, the few months of “rehabilitation” of expert advice into governmental 
crisis decision-making are unlikely to be a game changer in the secular trend 
of increased challenges to or of expertise in policymaking processes.
The formulation of exit strategies everywhere has demonstrated the limits 
of expert-driven policymaking. There is no evidence-based knowledge to 
apply. We only have experts who know well that they really don’t know 
how to formulate a policy on which so much is riding. Getting exits from 
lockdowns wrong may kill and it will be clear if it does. Rather than present-
ing this as a political challenge, policymakers are tempted to keep pushing 
experts to make those judgments for them. This is generating discomfort, 
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and may well compromise the viability of the newfound reliance on experts 
as a model to (re)introduce into “normal” policymaking.
Accountability in the face of deep uncertainty
Accountability is the hallmark of a democratic system. Knowing that an 
elected politician will have to explain why certain policy choices were made, 
imposes all sorts of conditions on the policymaking process. These condi-
tions impose a burden on policymakers, the literature tells us. The biggest 
burden may well be the sacred rule that accountable politicians must be well 
informed. This rule has prompted all sorts of mechanisms and protocols that 
have come to define policymaking in democracies.
The COVID-19 experience has thrown up an insurmountable challenge 
for policymakers and politicians alike. They have been operating under 
conditions of deep uncertainty. Their efforts veer between a principled ap-
proach (decision-making based on principles rather than information) and 
more pragmatic approach (experimenting with limited feedback). It is not 
clear at all if existing accountability mechanisms can cope with these ap-
proaches. It is even less clear what the implications will be for the world of 
policy. If principles are allowed to rule, what do traditional accountability 
rules still mean for policymakers? If trial and error is the way to go, what are 
the accompanying accountability rules?
Learning: reflection versus politicization
Nobody is against learning, as Aaron Wildavsky reminded us a long time 
ago. It is still true today. Yet policy scholars have systematically documented 
how hard it is to learn and apply lessons to the policymaking process. 
Learning the right lessons from a crisis is particularly hard (Boin et al. 2008). 
At the same time, we know it must be done. COVID-19 has demonstrated 
the fragility of our complex and tightly coupled systems, which policymak-
ers evidently cannot protect in the face of a pandemic. We know that this cri-
sis may last for quite some time. We also know that a new pandemic is very 
possible. So how do we learn from the COVID-19 experience to strengthen 
societal and institutional resilience? What can policymakers do to facilitate 
an effective learning process? How will they know what lessons to adopt 
and implement?
Learning begins with evaluation: did we achieve what we intended to 
achieve? Unfortunately, this question takes on a whole different meaning 
in the context of accountability. Then the question becomes: why did poli-
ticians (or institutions) not achieve what they had to achieve? The threat of 
“exposure” and punishment inevitably undermines the process of evalua-
tion. To explain is to blame, as the saying goes. If this lamentable condition 
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is not resolved, we risk ending up with no lessons learned, or worse, the 
wrong lessons learned.
If there is one lesson public administration researchers may take away 
from COVID-19, it is the need to learn in an unbiased and unimpeded way 
from crises and disasters. In a world that produces all sorts of upheavals – 
a changing climate, unstable financial systems, ongoing cyber threats – 
COVID-19 is but a reminder that we need to learn effectively and quickly. 
How can this be done without compromising democratic values, institu-
tions and practices? Time for public administration scholarship to step up to 
the plate (see also Boin and Lodge 2016).
Executive governance and policy 
advisory systems in a time of crisis
Jonathan Craft and John Halligan
The COVID-19 pandemic provides a stark reminder of the need for high-
quality policy advice in government and the uneven ability of the systems 
of advice around government to perform effectively, particularly during 
crises. Our analysis of the Australian, Canadian, New Zealand and United 
Kingdom (UK) responses focuses on how the policy problem was (mis)di-
agnosed, and divergent initial responses along with varying abilities to co-
ordinate policy advice and adapt. Despite a shared administrative tradition 
rooted in Westminster principles, the comparisons are stark. Australia and 
New Zealand featured similarities in early milestones, but then diverged 
when New Zealand opted for decisive and emphatic action. Canada and 
the UK fared much worse with clear evidence of failings in their advisory 
systems detailed below. Here we reflect on how each countries’ advisory 
system operated in this crisis and distil some lessons. This fast-moving and 
complex field cannot be properly analyzed in a brief review and so our focus 
is on a few notable comparisons.
Frequently compared, these countries share principles and practices of 
Westminster style government, some more defined than others, which guide 
how politicians, public servants, and others engage in advisory activity and 
exchanges. Responsible government is defined by the fusion of the execu-
tive and parliament along with primary features, including strong cabinet 
government, ministerial responsibility and a permanent bureaucracy that 
is neutral, non-partisan and professional. There are differences with struc-
ture – Canada and Australia feature federal systems while the UK and New 
Zealand are unitary systems – and with the countries’ reform pathways 
(Craft and Halligan 2020).
Governments grappled with the challenges of making sense of fast-mov-
ing science-based public health advice, both domestic and international, and 
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advice from departments and agencies spanning health, economics and public 
safety. Under normal conditions, the policy advisory systems (PAS), defined as 
the assemblage of advisory units and practices that exist at a given time with 
which governments and other actors engage for policy purposes, are marked 
by tensions. Several were more acute during the crisis, notably the role of expert 
advisers and the public service vis-a-vis the democratic principles of respon-
sible government, relationships with devolved governments and executive 
federalism, the mobilization of public services to overcome silos, and engage-
ment with other organizations. The pandemic also pulled the curtain back, with 
public briefings, often daily, that revealed data (of varying quality) and expert 
advice governments had at their disposal. This transparency departs from the 
typically opaque nature of Westminster PAS (Craft and Halligan 2020).
Three strategies: the experience of 
four countries
Three general responses are evident. New Zealand adopted an elimination 
strategy, while Australia and Canada favoured a suppression approach, 
which the UK was forced to adopt after early championing of the high-risk 
“herd immunity” approach. Table 1 details variance in the number of cases 
and in deaths per country.
Australia had an elaborate apparatus in place for processing international 
and national data and for national communication among Australia’s gov-
ernments. The machinery for handling a pandemic was triggered by the 
rapidly changing position in China. The Communicable Disease Network 
advocated a national health response. The National Incident Room 
(Department of Health) was activated and the Australian Health Protection 
Principal Committee (AHPPC) supported border controls for Wuhan flights 
(January 20). The first Health Sector Emergency Response Plan for Novel 
Coronavirus specified an escalating series of responses, from self-isolation 
of suspected cases to people working from home. Government activated the 
plan and declared that the coronavirus would become a global pandemic 
Table 1. COVID-19 Infections and Mortality Rates (As of August 10, 2020)
Country Infections Deaths Case-fatality Deaths/100K pop.
Australia 21,397 313 1.5% 1.25
Canada 121,367 9,028 7.4% 24.36
United Kingdom 312,574 46,659 14.9% 70.18
New Zealand 1,569 22 1.4% 0.45
Source: Johns Hopkins University (2020).
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(February 27, while the WHO did not do so until 12 March). Border closures 
were extended to cover high-risk countries from late February. Overseas ar-
rivals were required to self-isolate for 14 days from mid-March then borders 
were closed for non-citizens and residents (the hotel quarantine included 
Australians from March 29).
Canada’s response was incremental but failed to adequately seize early 
opportunities to get ahead of the pandemic. The early focus was on repa-
triation of Canadians abroad and dealing with cruise ships and not quickly 
imposing rigorous containment and suppression tactics. For example, man-
datory quarantining for those returning to Canada, or showing symptoms, 
was only invoked on April 14th. Poor data collection also hampered effective 
reporting and modelling, and capacity issues led to slow testing, tracing, 
and tracking. The best available advice missed the mark, advising govern-
ment that there was a low risk for within-country transmission until early 
March, only to recommend widespread societal and economic shutdowns 
two weeks later in response to community transmission and increased in-
fection and death rates (Tasker 2020a). The public service and Public Health 
Agency of Canada’s advice recommended management rather than early 
suppression via comprehensive mandatory screening and early tracking 
and tracing. The full authority of the Quarantine Act was not invoked in 
part due to advice that suggested compliance would be problematic and 
that self-isolation measures would ensure “less pressure on public health 
resources” (Tasker 2020a). This early response proved costly.
The New Zealand response to a rapidly mounting number of cases was 
the adoption of pandemic eradication, which mean eliminating community 
transmission. This was based on the government accepting the recommen-
dations of public health advisers. On March 19, it closed its borders to for-
eign travelers and made people coming home quarantine for 14 days. Then 
several days later as the number of cases soared, the government first intro-
duced level 3 restrictions followed by level 4, eliminate, which entailed full 
lockdown measures that were strict by international standards (see Table 2). 
The prime minister was able to claim in June that the virus had been erad-
icated (although cases have since surfaced). New Zealand has the advan-
tages of being a small island-based state with low population density and 
a centralized and integrated government. The extensive testing was high in 
international terms and tracing was facilitated by the lockdown. The mor-
tality rate has been similar to Australia (Table 1), but debates have occurred 
about the economic costs of the respective approaches.
The UK response was mired by multiple errors and missteps. It first ad-
opted a controversial strategy favouring widespread infection to develop 
“herd immunity.” It was compelled to adopt a more mainstream suppres-
sion approach including lockdowns and travel screening after climbing 
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right thing also extended to travel, border restrictions being delayed until 
early June. The vociferousness of the debates, the pervasiveness of the blame 
game and the division among experts and observers derive from a range of 
arguments bandied about. These include the poor condition of the National 
Health Service following a period of austerity; the handling of aged care; 
the fragmentation of the relevant machinery; and the composition of expert 
committees. The government has changed central decision-making bodies, 
crisis machinery and science advisory forums. The Cabinet Office Briefing 
Rooms (COBR) on COVID-19 included ministers from the three devolved 
nations but was criticized for lacking prime ministerial leadership as it was 
chaired by a minister until March. The COBR played a coordination and 
decision-making role but was superseded in May (IfG 2020). The advisory 
structure was there but failed to work well and was abused by the political 
executive. Unwilling to learn from the experience of others, the UK has been 
derided in the media for the attachment to British exceptionalism. The prime 
minister has been depicted as the wrong leader for this type of crisis. The 
death total is the fifth highest in the world and the death rate is the third 
highest (ignoring two micro-states).
New Zealand was able to use unitary arrangements to its advantage but 
had to overcome its siloed public service to ensure a coherent response 
and the government used a highly centralized approach to securing co-
ordination across the system, along with heavy reliance on and deference 
to expertise, and earlier and more comprehensive public restrictions. The 
situation was more complicated with the devolved systems whereby na-
tional governments have greater financial wherewithal but the main deliv-
ery responsibilities rest with subnational units. In Canada, collaborative 
executive federalism was essential but hampered by problems of poor 
quality and inconsistent data, spotty availability of personal protective 
equipment, and poor provincial responses to select outbreaks in seniors’ 
care facilities and pockets of seasonal workers. Australia’s response has 
been more effective with formal and structured approaches to collabo-
rative federalism and policy coordination. National Cabinet comprising 
the prime minister, state premiers and territory chief ministers became 
a key inter-party decision maker for many purposes from mid-March, 
with regular meetings to review progress with COVIDSafe Australia. 
National Cabinet was determined to be a more effective body for national 
decision-making than the Council of Australian Governments, which was 
replaced by a National Federation Reform Council centred on National 
Cabinet. The need to achieve a united front nationally on core issues is 
important in larger and more complex systems. In devolved systems, 
the challenge is to balance national strategies with discretion for nations, 
provinces and states so that they can respond to local needs.
BEYOND COVID-19 349
Implications of structuring advice
Governments made important choices in how to structure advice and key 
advisory processes. The UK’s reliance on the Scientific Advisory Group for 
Emergencies (Sage) has been singled out for the fragmented and faulty re-
sponse. Early criticisms were levelled at politicization given high profile No 
10 special advisor Dominic Cummings had attended meetings, but it was 
more roundly criticized for its lack of transparency and an inappropriate 
mix of expertise. It has been argued that, “If independent public health ex-
perts had not been excluded from the core committee, which is dominated 
by modellers, virologists, clinical academics and behavioural scientists, the 
influenza-driven ‘herd immunity’ strategy might not have materialised” 
(Costello 2020). Jeremy Hunt, a recent health minister and chair of the health 
select committee in charge of reviewing the UK handling of COVID-19, ob-
serves that “the failure to look at what [Asian] countries were doing at the 
outset will rank as one of the biggest failures of scientific advice to Ministers 
in our lifetimes” (Hunt 2020).
Poor responsiveness and slow-moving machinery were apparent. Public 
Health England (PHE), the executive agency established to provide advice 
on public health issues has been critiqued for a slow response. PHE had 
the responsibility for testing: “the decision to abandon widespread tracking 
of the virus as it began to spread is regarded by most scientists as the key 
mistake in Britain’s handling of the pandemic, which has led to the country 
recording the highest number of deaths in Europe.” Its slow responses, 
“forced the government to take over some of its functions and set up new 
bodies… the test and trace service had to be taken out of PHE’s hands, while 
the Joint Biosecurity Centre, which determines the COVID alert level, had 
been set up specifically to do a job PHE should have been doing” (Rayner 
2020). Failures to adapt and modify responses in light of the fast-changing 
consensus and evidence on COVID-19 was a major catalyst for the poor UK 
and early Canadian performances.
For at-risk groups, lack of responsiveness was also apparent. In Australia, 
two neglected communities have been variously depicted as a “missed op-
portunity,” “blind spots” and the subject of “ad hoc” engagement. The first 
involves high-risk groups like migrant communities with suggestions that 
pandemic messages were not registering, particularly where English was 
a second language. A May report was discussed with the AHPPC, the key 
decision-making body for health emergencies, but did not register in the 
system. A second report argues that most Indigenous Australians reside in 
urban areas, but the focus has been on remote communities and the needs 
and risks of urban communities have been overlooked. Canada, as already 
noted, also failed to target responses for at-risk communities including mi-
grant workers and long-term care seniors’ facilities. Adequately responding 
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to constituencies and sectors that are vulnerable or at-risk will continue to 
challenge all four countries as they implement economic responses and 
grapple with potential second waves of the virus.
Doing better: balanced input, 
transparency, agility
Governments need to recognize the limits of public service and expert advice 
in a crisis. It may not be stress-tested and may be contradictory. Executives 
have to be careful with using non-public service advice (e.g., health units, ex-
perts on committees) that they are not accustomed to and take care organiz-
ing and balancing various forms of advice. The preparedness to act early and 
boldly in moving between levels of internal lockdown was vital in suppress-
ing coronavirus. It is well-established that the timing of interventions is critical 
for flattening the infections curve. This also applies to where reversals occur 
when quick and decisive action is needed to resurrect some form of lockdown. 
The risks of relying on non-mandatory, incremental interventions are high.
The closed and opaque nature of PAS can be problematic in crises when 
confronted with the need to educate and engage society as part of a coor-
dinated response. New Zealand, with a tradition of Cabinet transparency, 
meant that citizens and the press could access cabinet minutes and papers 
on COVID-19 related matters. The Australian National Cabinet is also nota-
ble for providing details of meeting decisions and key advisory documents. 
In contrast, the UK was highly secretive, with the activities of the Sage com-
mittee drawing particularly stinging criticisms that ultimately led to the 
publication of meeting minutes. The Canadian response featured frequent 
public briefings by public health officials and politicians, but little public 
access to the policy advice provided to federal Cabinet.
Finally, governments that were able to pivot quickly did better. Adaptability 
in the short-term is not necessarily a strong suit of PAS in Anglophone coun-
tries, but they do have the ability to change and a reputation for responding 
well under emergencies. Governments that can tap the exigencies of a crisis 
to galvanize agencies, sectors and jurisdictions to act and collaborate are 
more successful.
Balancing accountability and action 
during COVID-19: how the Emergencies 
Act provided a model for an 
empowered Parliament
Kathy Brock and Lori Turnbull
Westminster parliamentary systems work by striking a well-calibrated 
balance between a powerful executive branch that can take decisions and 
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actions effectively and a functional legislative branch that holds the govern-
ment to account. In times of emergency, the balance between decisiveness 
and accountability tends to lean more heavily towards an even more pow-
erful, effective executive. However, even in exceptional times, the actions 
of the executive have been subject to the review of Parliament, sometimes 
retroactively. Once an emergency or exceptional circumstances pass, the 
equilibrium between the branches should be restored to normal levels of ac-
countability, lest we lose the healthy and vital system of counterweights in a 
parliamentary democracy.
During the extraordinary conditions created during the COVID-19 crisis, 
the Liberal minority government made deals with the New Democratic, Bloc 
Québecois, and Green parties which reduced the ability of Parliament to 
hold the executive to account by eliminating key levers of power at the op-
position’s disposal and by limiting the frequency of House of Commons sit-
tings. This was neither necessary nor desirable given that the parties could 
have opted for an alternate model retaining the full powers of Parliament to 
scrutinize the executive while enabling the executive to act swiftly to meet 
the challenges posed by the pandemic. This episode raises serious questions 
about the nature and scope of multiparty agreements, the relationship of the 
executive to the legislative branch, and the role of Parliament in crises – all 
of which merit further investigation and research in the future.
Government interventions under pressure
In the early days of the pandemic, the federal government amended the 
Financial Administration Act to permit using special warrants to make pay-
ments to Canadians without Parliament sitting (Bill C-12). Parliament 
passed the amendments quickly and under pressure just before adjourning 
to allow members of parliament to return home and social distance. Within 
two weeks, a reconvened Parliament passed an $82 billion federal aid pack-
age called the COVID-19 Emergency Response Act (Bill C-13). This sweeping 
statute made several amendments to existing legislation to extend dead-
lines for tax filing and payment, increase Canada Child Benefit payments, 
introduce new Emergency Care and Emergency Support Benefits as well as 
an Indigenous Community Support fund. It also allowed the Ministry of 
Finance to borrow without authorization of the Governor in Council and 
extended budget and debt reporting requirements. This bill also was passed 
under pressure with scrutiny mainly limited to a special House commit-
tee and some House members and Senators passing it without full scrutiny 
or knowledge of its contents. Two further bills (C-14 and C-15) provided 
subsidies to small business employees and students and extended report-
ing deadlines for other Finance matters. Further emergency measures were 
introduced under the Quarantine Act, the Aeronautics Act, and other federal 
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legislation and regulations. Orders in council have been used to implement 
many important aspects of the federal response to COVID-19, including the 
Canada-US border closure, efforts to manage food and drug shortages, and 
Income Tax Act amendments. In contrast, the UK and Australian COVID-19 
Response Acts and other legislation were debated and amended in both of 
those parliaments which operated to allow opposition questioning of gov-
ernment actions on COVID-related and other matters.
Throughout the COVID-19 lockdown period, Prime Minister Justin 
Trudeau announced relief programs for individuals and businesses, travel 
restrictions, physical distancing rules, and border closures that posed un-
precedented economic, social, and health related consequences. These an-
nouncements were made from his Rideau Cottage residence as opposed to 
the House of Commons, which meant that the immediate reaction to these 
announcements came from journalists rather than Members of Parliament. 
As a result, the response of the opposition to the announcements was often 
delayed or received little coverage in the media.
Sidelining the legislative branch
Under a multiparty agreement struck by the Liberals, NDP and Bloc 
Québecois, the House met in plenary one day per week with most members 
attending through remote technology. A Special COVID-19 Committee of 
all House members met virtually two days per week to raise any matters 
related to the COVID-19 crisis. Votes were suspended in the House owing to 
technical complications. Standing committees continued virtual meetings. 
The Senate decided to adjourn to June 2 unless required to meet to pass leg-
islation relating to COVID-19, although its committees could continue any 
COVID-related business through virtual meetings. This meant that the abil-
ity of both houses to consider government measures was limited. Another 
multiparty agreement (between the Liberals, the NDP and the Greens) com-
menced in late May, removing the possibility of opposition days, private 
members bills, and order paper questions for the remainder of the spring 
sitting (Canadian Press 2020). All of these mechanisms are integral to oppo-
sition parties’ ability to affect the parliamentary agenda, initiate confidence 
votes, give voice to their priorities, and obtain meaningful answers to their 
questions on government actions and policies. It was easy to forget that this 
was, in fact, a minority government, whose command of the confidence of 
the House could not be tested or assured in such an environment.
There was one shining moment that demonstrated the indispensable role 
that the opposition plays in holding the government to account and vali-
dated the importance of Parliament. Though all federal parties supported 
the aid package (Bill C-13), the Conservative Party pushed back on a gov-
ernment proposal to tax, spend, and borrow broadly without parliamentary 
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approval until December 2021. The Liberals acquiesced to a revised dead-
line of September 30th. But things went downhill from there. The NDP and 
Greens’ deal with the Liberals, who were looking to break for the summer, 
significantly undermined Parliament’s ability to do its job. In exchange for 
a promise from the prime minister to talk to the provinces about pursuing 
universal sick leave, the two opposition parties gave away almost every tool 
in the opposition’s toolkit. The multiparty agreement effectively neutralized 
the opposition at a time when the government was exercising tremendous 
power.
The government and opposition parties were acting in a compressed time 
period in an exceptional time when pressures to respond to the COVID-
19 crisis were escalating daily. Members of Parliament wanted to meet the 
needs of Canadians in the crisis and to model the need for social distancing. 
These considerations affected their decision to have a truncated Parliament 
in operation. It is understandable but, as mentioned, the UK and Australian 
parliaments were able to continue operations with virtual voting. In Canada, 
the government and opposition parties did not use but had available to them 
a model of how Parliament could operate with full powers to scrutinize gov-
ernment without limiting the ability of the executive to respond decisively 
and powerfully to the crisis. That model can be found in the provisions of 
the Emergencies Act.
Multiparty agreements vs. the 
Emergencies Act
In March 2020, the federal government contemplated invoking Emergencies 
Act (R.S.C. 1988, c.29) to empower it to deal with coronavirus related mat-
ters. The Act was written “to ensure safety and security” during emergen-
cies by authorizing the Canadian government “to take special temporary 
measures that may not be appropriate in normal times” (Preamble). Instead, 
the government decided not to invoke the Act, viewing it as “a measure of 
last resort” in the words of Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland (Tasker 
2020b). Under the terms of the Act, it could only be invoked if the federal 
government proclaimed that the COVID-19 situation constituted a “public 
welfare emergency” after consultations with the provinces had yielded in-
tergovernmental agreement that the situation exceeded “the capacity or au-
thority of a province to deal with it” (Ss. 3, 3.a, 5.b).
Using the legislative and other policy instruments mentioned above, the 
federal government was able to adopt the necessary measures that com-
plemented the actions being taken by the provinces and territories to deal 
with the crisis. Although not invoked in the initial phases of the crisis, the 
Emergencies Act provides a model for ensuring executive accountability 
ARJEN BOIN ET AL.354
to Parliament during a crisis that the parties could have adopted for the 
COVID-19 crisis rather than the one secured by the multiparty agreements.
First, and foremost, the Emergencies Act locates responsibility and pow-
ers for dealing with a declared emergency to the executive consistent with 
the Westminster model of parliamentary government in two ways. The re-
sponsibility for assessing the situation and declaring that it constitutes an 
emergency consistent with the defined terms in the Act rests with Cabinet 
(S. 3). The legislation also confers on Cabinet broad and sweeping powers 
to make temporary orders and regulations that it constitutes are necessary 
for dealing with the emergency but that might not be appropriate in normal 
circumstances (Ss. 8, Preamble). To this extent, the actions that the Liberal 
government took during the COVID-19 crisis (to the time of writing), were 
consistent with the Act’s vision of strong, decisive executive action.
Second, the terms of the Emergencies Act depart from the multiparty agree-
ment and what transpired during the COVID-19 crisis. The Act renders the 
executive fully accountable for the decisions and actions that government 
takes in an emergency both during the emergency and afterwards. Unlike 
the preceding War Measures Act, which allowed Cabinet to govern by or-
der-in-council and bypass the House of Commons and Senate (Smith 2020), 
the Emergencies Act stipulates that Cabinet exercises its temporary emergency 
powers “subject to the supervision of Parliament,” the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms and other rights legislation, and the federal division of powers in 
the Constitution Act 1867 (Preamble). Judicial review of government actions 
is likely to be limited “as courts would defer to Cabinet’s interpretation of 
the Act, its assessment of the situation and its determination of which par-
ticular measures are necessary” (Block and Goldenberg 2020; cf. West and 
Forcese 2020 as quoted in Balakrishnan 2020). Thus, the more powerful and 
immediate oversight power resides with Parliament.
Parliament exercises its powers of review in three ways according to 
the Emergencies Act: reviewing the declaration of an emergency; reviewing 
every order or regulation made by Cabinet during the emergency; and a 
post-emergency review. Under the Act, Parliament has the power to review 
Cabinet’s emergency declaration, reasons for the declaration, and the report 
prepared by the government on its own consultations with the provinces 
within seven sitting days of the declaration (Ss. 58.1, 58.5). Parliament may 
revoke the emergency declaration (S. 58.7) or a continuation or amendment 
of an emergency declaration (S. 60). Given that a declaration of emergency 
is likely to be taken with much forethought as the previous comments by 
Freeland indicates, this power is important but not where a government 
is likely to stumble. For our purposes here, it is significant that in contrast 
to the multiparty agreement, in this model Parliament is fully operational 
with enhanced opportunities to examine the decisions and reasoning of the 
government.
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More pertinent to the COVID-19 situation are the provisions in the Act 
concerning orders and regulations. Cabinet must submit every order or reg-
ulation to Parliament for review. Both Houses, not just one, would need to 
agree if an order or regulation were to be revoked (S. 61). This allows for 
transparency and review of government actions but sets a high bar for those 
actions to be quashed. If an order or regulation is confidential, then it would 
be reviewed in private by a parliamentary review committee comprising 
members from both Houses and accepted or rejected (Ss. 61, 62). This review 
would bolster public confidence that all government actions are not taken 
surreptitiously or arbitrarily. Under the multiparty agreement, the opposi-
tion parties relinquished this important power of review and veto.
The most important power of review lies in the post-emergency phase. 
The Emergencies Act requires Cabinet to strike an inquiry into its declaration 
of an emergency and the actions it took during the emergency with a report 
to Parliament within a year of the end of the emergency (S. 63). This allows 
Parliament to consider the government’s action in a more reasonable time 
and to make recommendations for future situations. This step is not covered 
by the agreement and yet is critical to good governance.
In contrast to the multiparty agreements, the Emergencies Act provides 
a model of a fully operational Parliament that can ensure executive ac-
countability and is much closer to the model that operated in Britain. If 
the parties had agreed to adopt a similar model using remote technology, 
then Parliament would have continued to play a vital role in responding 
to the COVID-19 crisis and would have been able to ensure that the regu-
lar business of government would have continued to be subject to debate 
and scrutiny. Among other things, special unsupervised spending warrants 
would not have been justified, the government could have been rigorously 
questioned in the House on its spending announcements, and the delay in 
closing the border or any orders under other acts could have been investi-
gated and perhaps revoked in Parliament if over-reaching or not justified.1 
Parliament would have remained and been seen to be a vital institution in 
responding to emergencies and crises rather than as a shadow in the wings.
Conclusion: an agenda for research
These events raise important questions about the role of Parliament and 
whether multiparty agreements ought to be used as a vehicle through 
which to cede critical levers of power at its disposal. Further areas for re-
search include: the nature and scope of multiparty agreements; the possi-
bility of amending House rules and procedures to provide for a model of 
Parliament to operate during crises like COVID-19 similar to the model in 
the Emergencies Act; whether any fundamental changes to the operation of 
the House of Commons should require all-party agreement under the rules 
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and procedures of the House; updates to the Emergency Act given recent 
changes in the Senate; other means of ensuring executive accountability to 
Parliament during crises and exceptional circumstances if an emergency is 
not declared; and, a comparison of how parliaments within Canada and in-
ternationally fared in holding the executive to account during the global 
pandemic.
Lessons from the Great Financial 
Crisis (GFC) to COVID-19: budgetary 
responses and future challenges
Geneviève Tellier
There is no doubt that the current pandemic is exceptional. All over the 
world, governments implemented drastic measures to limit the propagation 
of COVID-19. Economically, these measures were unprecedented: borders 
were shut down, businesses closed, workers forced to work from home, etc. 
In Canada, it is reported that the GDP has plummeted by 12% while the un-
employment rate rose to 13% during the first two months of the pandemic 
(Statistics Canada 2020). The federal government now forecasts that its 
deficit will total 343.2 billion dollars for 2020–2021 (Department of Finance 
2020). This figure will in all probability increase.
How do we deal with a crisis of this magnitude? To find some answers 
to this question, what follows first turns our attention to the past, and then 
identifies some promising lines of research for public budgeting and public 
administration scholars.
From the GFC to COVID-19: lessons 
learned and unfinished business
Only a decade ago, we witnessed another major event, the 2009 financial 
crisis, viewed then as the biggest economic recession in modern times: busi-
ness activities plunged to record low, unemployment rose, and investments 
stalled. All around the globe, governments were asked to bail out major 
private companies and help workers who had lost their job. Although not 
identical, the current pandemic and the 2009 GFC share many similarities. 
Among these, they both required massive public financial interventions. 
Therefore, it seems natural to examine what lessons were learned from the 
GFC and analyze if they can help us manage the present crisis as well as its 
aftermath.
The GFC taught us two important things about public budgeting. The first 
was that strong government interventions are needed to prompt economic 
recovery. This new course of action came after years of austerity measures, 
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balanced budget initiatives, tax cuts, etc. In other words, Keynesian ideas 
were rediscovered2. The second important lesson was that national pub-
lic policies are vulnerable to external events. Nowadays, globalization not 
only entails the circulation of goods, services and financial resources. It is 
also about national public policies that have been impacted by decisions oc-
curring elsewhere. Governments must be prepared to work collaboratively 
with other governments (international, national, and subnational) and vari-
ous other stakeholders in an uncertain environment.3
Have governments learned from these lessons? Were they better prepared 
to face a severe crisis? Looking at the response of the federal Canadian gov-
ernment to the pandemic caused by COVID-19, the answer is yes, up to a 
point. The federal government adopted and implemented relief measures 
that targeted millions of Canadians and businesses in only a few weeks. 
This was impressive considering how long it usually takes to set up new 
programs. In addition to considerable political will, the administrative ap-
paratus was flexible enough to quickly initiate a response.
The federal government was also able to secure the support of parlia-
mentarians to use special warrants, within days. Without these warrants, 
it would not have been able to use public funds, while parliament is ad-
journed. Partisanship was put aside during this major national crisis, even 
though the government was in a minority position. This contrast sharply 
with the GFC when the minority conservative government was under at-
tack from opposition parties for its weak recovery strategy. In addition, the 
Department of Finance and the Bank of Canada made sure enough liquidity 
was available for businesses and Canadian governments, again within days. 
This decision allowed Canadian governments to direct their attention to re-
covery initiatives. They will deal with the issues of high deficits and debt 
repayments latter.
Finally, the Canadian government was in constant communication with 
other countries and with international organizations to coordinate the re-
sponse to the pandemic. Overall, the Canadian government reacted swiftly 
to address the COVID-19 pandemic, a sharp contrast with Canada’s initial 
response to the GFC.4
However, I want to suggest that the Canadian response to the GFC and 
COVID-19 remains an unfinished business. GFC was not just about the col-
lapse of the US housing market that spread to economic sectors all over the 
globe. It also brought to light the issue of economic inequalities, revealing 
growing disparities between the few most affluent in our society and the 
rest of the population, the precarious working conditions, the increasing 
costs of living, etc. The rise of various popular protests here and abroad 
(Yellow Jackets, Brexit, Occupy Wall Street, Printemps Érable, to name a few) 
and the election of populist leaders (Trump, Bolsonaro, Kurz, etc.) all point 
in the same direction: there is a growing disaffection about the use of public 
ARJEN BOIN ET AL.358
financial resources. The problem concerns equally how governments fund 
public services as well as how they collect revenues. Furthermore, there is 
not a strong consensus on the solution to be adopted. For some, public ex-
penditures and taxes are too high, while others find them too low.
The events that have triggered the pandemic crisis and the GFC are en-
tirely different. However, they required similar government actions and fo-
cused attention on inequalities prevalent in our society. Indeed, the current 
pandemic offers an extraordinary opportunity to reflect on these issues and 
make progress.
Three promising areas for budgeting research
Setting up a universal basic income (UBI) program. The purpose of a UBI is 
to provide an unconditional income to all Canadians, regardless of their 
work status. By doing so, a UBI would replace existing social programs 
that provide conditional financial support to specific groups (such as the 
unemployed, the elderly, students, people with disabilities, etc.). It is there-
fore seen as a new way to deliver public services that values simplicity and 
flexibility. However, many observers fear that the costs associated with a 
UBI would make it prohibitive, while others believe that it will create dis-
incentives to work. This explains why so few governments have ventured 
into seriously considering it.5 However, the implementation of the Canada 
Emergency Response Benefit (CERB) that targeted almost all Canadians has 
automatically revived the idea. The federal government has also implicitly 
suggested that a Canadian UBI should be set at $24,000 per year (the CERB 
provides $2,000 per month). Whether it will be deemed a success or not, we 
are in the midst of an exceptional natural experiment, which will provide a 
unique set of reliable data to explore the feasibility and implementation of a 
national UBI in Canada.
Do major crises generate more consensual public policies? As research has 
demonstrated over the years, government ideologies do shape public poli-
cies.6 Moreover, the gap between right-wing and left-wing ideologies has re-
cently widened, leading to a more polarized political landscape. However, the 
various measures adopted to mitigate the economic impacts of the pandemic 
may signal a realignment. Federal and provincial Canadian governments of 
all stripes have swiftly implemented attenuating measures to counter the 
negative effects of the pandemic. On closer examination, we notice some 
variations: some governments seem more inclined to offer direct monetary 
assistance to individuals and businesses (in British Columbia, Québec, New 
Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador and at the federal level), while oth-
ers seem more supportive of tax relief measures (Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario).7 
How can these differences be explained? Are they meaningful? Will they last? 
Furthermore, the pandemic may force some political parties to rethink their 
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political propositions, especially right-wing parties. Can it still be possible to 
advocate spending cuts, tax cuts, or both, while promising improved public 
services? If so, how? Overall, research should investigate if the pandemic will 
influence the ideological stance of political parties.
Embracing fiscal sociology. Fiscal sociology investigates the relationship be-
tween the state, society and taxation. It tries to understand why we consent 
collectively to pay taxes, by paying close attention to the influences of insti-
tutions, the redistribution of wealth, and the use of various tax policy instru-
ments. After some promising debuts (initiated by the work of de Tocqueville 
and Pareto, and subsequently by Goldstein, Schumpeter, Mann), this field of 
research went largely unnoticed. It has been, however, recently rediscovered 
in the US and in Europe.8 Fiscal sociology would be particularly useful for 
analyzing economic inequalities and examining how taxation can alleviate 
these inequalities. Furthermore, its contribution would also be valuable to 
study the intergenerational redistribution of public debts (which will be 
substantial in the coming years).
Concluding remarks: looking towards the 
big picture
The research topics identified above have a common element: each explicitly 
acknowledges that politics matters when budgetary issues are being dis-
cussed, analyzed, and policies are developed and implemented as a result. 
My hope is that, among the usual focus on managing deficits, debt, and fiscal 
policy, these suggestions will contribute to developing this field of research.
Some researchers have recently expressed concerns about how research in 
public administration is often missing the big picture: the discipline should 
not just focus on the study of administrative reform (the meso-level of gov-
ernment). Where public budgeting is concerned, future research should also 
pay attention to the overall direction and performance of government (the 
macro-level) and acknowledge the presence and influences of political val-
ues (Botterill and Fenna 2019; Roberts 2020).
Traditionalism or transformation? 
Canada’s COVID-19 response and the 
future of digital government
Jeffrey Roy
COVID-19 is both an accelerator and disruptor of digital government. 
Acceleration stems from concerted efforts to devise data-driven analy-
sis and surveillance systems aimed at lessening the spread of infection, 
and digital service channels have evolved from an option for delivering 
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government services to essential “digital by default” platforms in support 
of an unprecedented expansion of individual and commercial support 
programs. With at least the temporary closure of most physical service 
centres, and an enormous strain on telephony channels, online platforms 
are certain to play an expanded and central role in the service delivery 
apparatus of the public sector going forward. Yet across these health and 
service realms – and more widely across the public sector – disruption 
also stems from the accelerated pace of digitization (inside and outside of 
government) as well as pre-coronavirus digital agendas now potentially 
stymied or recast in light of shifting policy and political priorities. How 
such tensions are dealt with will shape the future of digital government 
and, by extension, the evolution of public sector governance during and 
after the COVID-19 pandemic.
It helps to provide some parameters around the fluid term “digital gov-
ernment.” This term has evolved since some scholars distinguish between 
earlier notions of “e-government” as a more basic and linear extension of 
the public sector into the Internet era (Roy 2006; Pablo et al. 2007; Gasco 
2014; OECD 2015; Clarke et al. 2017). By contrast, “digital government” 
offers a more transformative and dynamic prism also deemed “Public 
Administration 2.0” (Lips 2012; Reddick and Aikins 2012; Roy 2013, 2017, 
and 2019; Clarke et al. 2017; Clarke 2019), which has been adopted by the 
Canadian government (Government of Canada 2017).
As Lips and many others have argued, we must consider if and how digi-
tal government disrupts traditional public administration (TPA), competing 
theories such as new public management (NPM), public value manage-
ment (PVM) and new public governance (NPG). Furthermore, we must add 
digital era governance (DEG), a template that Lindquist and Huse suggest 
is less distinct and more encompassing of shifting elements of the others 
(Dunleavy et al. 2006; Dunleavy 2010; Lindquist and Huse 2017). Arguably 
the most thorough review of these varying though often inter-related per-
spectives is Clarke’s detailed examination of the Government of Canada’s 
digital efforts (Clarke 2019). Importantly, for our purposes, Clarke contrasts 
traditional public administration – presenting it as closed government, with 
more outward and transformational perspectives of digital government: 
“…whether by challenging the silos and hierarchies that have long under-
pinned a closed bureaucrat-bureaucrat relationship, or by calling for the up-
take of new agile and open policy making and service delivery approaches, 
the dominant theories of digital government offered to date argue that 
closed government is entirely incompatible with the demands of governing 
in the digital age” (Clarke 2019: 11). As the personal computer era evolves 
into the mobile device era, such a contrast becomes evermore relevant to the 
inherent tensions facing the public sector (Roy 2013 and 2017). The creation 
of public value, in turn, becomes more networked, more open, and more 
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participative (Stoker 2006; O’Flynn 2007; Clarke et al. 2017; Fountain 2017; 
Margetts 2017; Pederson 2020).
Millard provides a thoughtful and encompassing perspectives of open gov-
ernance and the recasting of public sector organization and action (Millard 
2015). He articulates broad directions for systemic openness as an underly-
ing paradigm for transformational digital government (Millard 2015). Such 
an orientation is at least partially reflected in more contemporary forms of 
open government – as well as the Open Government Partnership (OGP) in-
ternationally (Francoli 2014 and 2015; Francoli and Clarke 2014). Millard’s 
directions are also closely aligned with many prescriptive suggestions put 
forth by Clarke in her (pre-COVID-19) undertaking. For example, she seeks 
“digital era open government” and calls for Ministerial commitments to be 
more horizontal and networked accountability and a more outward pub-
lic service that “must go to platforms and forums where stakeholders and 
citizens are already congregating and where nongovernmental actors are 
the dominant players setting the terms of the conversation” (Clarke 2019: 
206). Yet, a key and over-arching lesson from her investigation is that inertia 
rooted in TPA acts as a major constraint on systemic reform (ibid.).
Pandemic response and digital government 
since COVID-19
At the time of writing, two intertwined impacts of COVID-19 stand out for 
consideration with respect to digitization and its impacts on public sector: 
i) pandemic support-assistance and digital-service channels; and ii) health-
related surveillance and pandemic-tracking mobile phone apps designed 
for such a purpose.9
With respect to pandemic supports for individuals and companies, a case 
can be made that the federal government’s immediate efforts with digital 
delivery channels have thus far been a qualified success. Faced with the 
emergence of digital-by-default by necessity, unparalleled user demand, 
and a tremendous sense of urgent need, billions of dollars of assistance 
were fast-tracked and provided via online channels with minimal delays. 
Such performance contrasts with many federal government digital and 
technological system mishaps in recent years (including concerns conveyed 
by the Auditor General about the readiness of digital service channels) as 
well as the March 2020 technical struggles of the US federal government 
in their support for small businesses. Invariably, this Canadian “success” 
is tempered by numerous instances of individuals facing delays or process-
ing challenges, and the over-burdening of call centre operations as a result 
(widely reported upon by media sources through March and April).
Two broad implications of such efforts stand out: first, concerns around the 
absence of sufficient oversight in terms of both digital-service performance 
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and overarching policy and financing decisions (a key facet of Parliamentary 
debate in recent months); and second, a potential reversion to centralized 
digital service design at the expense of service innovation predicated on user 
engagement and collaborative design. Other observers highlight the related 
risk of rushed delivery solutions rather than more thoughtful investments in 
underlying digital architectures (Miller 2020). Key questions going forward 
stem from such tensions, as well as the degree to which digital-by-default 
becomes a more accepted and utilized form of service interaction with the 
public sector across wider segments of society.
Mobile phone apps have played key roles in the more successful efforts 
of numerous countries to further pandemic tracking and tracing efforts, in-
cluding early adopters such as Singapore and South Korea. The former’s de-
cision to release the underlying open source code for the app allowed other 
jurisdictions to follow suit, as Alberta (the first and only Canadian jurisdic-
tion as of June 2020). In June 2020, Prime Minister Trudeau seemingly com-
mitted to a forthcoming pan-Canadian under development. Around that 
time, Apple and Alphabet (Google) collaborated in an unprecedented man-
ner to design an app compatible with Apple and Android devices. Fuelled 
by privacy protection concerns and actors such as Privacy International, the 
German Government was even persuaded to abandon its own model. As 
one German official observed: “We need to have a discussion on how Silicon 
Valley is increasingly taking over the job of a nation state.… But we don’t 
need to have it amid a pandemic” (Scott et al. 2020). This has heightened 
concerns about the implications of COVID-19 tracking and data-gathering 
capacities for citizens and fears that “digital surveillance tools will become 
permanent” (Momani 2020).
As Canadian governments decide whether and how to proceed with a 
pan-Canadian model of app-based tracing, the underlying constraints of 
traditional federalism present an additional variable. A central question is 
whether the pandemic crisis will spur more innovative and collaborative 
governance arrangements across federal, provincial and territorial levels – 
or whether traditional politics and administrative structures of Canadian 
federalism will impede such an effort. Although federalism can spur flex-
ibility and variation (as it has across provinces and territories in many as-
pects of data-driven efforts in response to COVID-19), here it bears noting 
that the Liberal government has committed to a national model which argu-
ably suggests a leading role on the part of the federal government.
An agenda for digital government and 
governance research in the pandemic era
The over-arching lesson from the preceding, preliminary review of the 
digital contours of the Government of Canada’s COVID-19 response is a 
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familiar tension between traditionalism and transformation (Roy 2006 and 
2008; Clarke 2019). Despite pressures for greater systemic openness and so-
cietal mobilization generally, and stemming from pandemic reactions and 
responses, COVID-19 may strengthen many aspects of the core functioning 
of Westminster democratic governance and traditional public administra-
tion, rather than spark more systemic openness and governance innovation, 
especially in the near term. Such a viewpoint is reinforced by the emerging 
fiscal realities across all governments in Canada that suggest austerity meas-
ures ahead. Such reinforcing of traditionalism does not negate the important 
digital efforts of recent years and, indeed, potential opportunities lie ahead, 
especially as governments have increasingly embraced more transforma-
tional principles pertaining to digital government and given the accelerated 
digital transformation of society at large in light of the pandemic (particu-
larly the explosion of online commerce and remote working arrangements).
On the latter point, much depends on mobilizing civil society and aca-
demic and professional research communities and their ideas and result-
ing influences on governmental action and priorities. For example, calls 
for a National Data Architecture by the University of Waterloo’s Centre for 
International Governance Innovation seem especially prescient at the mo-
ment, whereas the formation of the Canadian COVID-19 Accountability 
Group to publicly advocate for openness and oversight of pandemic re-
sponse spending further reflects new elements of our collective pandemic 
governance systems that could emerge. This special journal issue devoted 
to COVID-19 is a further example of the potential importance of such 
contributions.
Four areas are especially ripe for investigation as part of a renewed re-
search agenda linking public administration, the coronavirus pandemic, 
and digitalization. The thematic areas are:
1. the evolving and presumably shifting service delivery apparatus of 
the public sector, the extent to which digital channels grow in pre-
dominance relative to other channels, and the impacts of such a shift 
on service design and execution;
2. the emergence and effectiveness of more horizontal, networked and col-
laborative governance arrangements across governments (both within 
and across jurisdictions);
3. the changing contours of open government and whether systemic open-
ness tied to the three dimensions of past federal Open Government Action 
Plans (information, data and dialogue) can be levers for better oversight 
and accountability of governmental actions and enablers of public-sector 
and societal innovation in responding to new pandemic challenges; and
4. understanding and critically assessing the expansion of data security and 
cyber-security challenges tied to the pandemic and their interplay with 
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a potentially fluid national security agenda (a theme excluded from this 
short article).
Running within and across these inter-related research themes is the 
emerging hypothesis from our discussion here: whether or not the pandemic 
will create conditions for a reversion to more traditional forms of public ad-
ministration (more centralized, controlling and less open), posited as the 
most likely trajectory for what lies ahead; or, instead, whether new forms 
of more shared and networked governance models predicated on systemic 
openness can be forged. With respect to the latter, there is fertile intellectual 
groundwork from prior to the pandemic which envisioned digitally and 
openness-minded reforms (Clarke et al. 2017; Lindquist and Huse 2017; Roy 
2019; Clarke 2019). One specific area meriting further attention is whether 
a reshaped public-sector ethos emerges from the pandemic (yes, this com-
mentary suggests systemic constraints to such emergence), and whether 
more horizontal, outward and networked governance formations emerge 
(and, if indeed they do emerge, what sort of accountability mechanisms are 
formed and deployed to balance openness-laden innovation with inward 
pressures for control).
Conclusion
This article began by stating that COVID-19 is both an accelerator and po-
tential disruptor of digital government. As the federal government faces 
rapidly growing program spending pressures and invariably the limits of 
its own actions, and as demands for digital infrastructure and digital lit-
eracy heighten across society at large, it is arguably imperative that the 
Government of Canada become more agile and innovative both internally 
and in concert with other government levels, other sectors and with the pub-
lic at large. Yet given the propensity of crises to reinforce centralized lead-
ership and governance control within the Westminster governance system, 
embracing this reorientation will be no small task and much will depend 
upon the evolution of political leadership and public expectations as the 
scope and impacts of COVID-19 become more fully apparent.
Notes
 1 In contrast to the federal legislation, the BC emergency legislation does not provide for leg-
islative scrutiny of the temporary suspension, override or replacement of existing statutes in 
an emergency which the BC Ombudsperson found contrary to the principles of good admin-
istration including transparency and accountability (2020: 35)
 2 This does not mean that all countries implemented similar stimulus packages, nor that all 
agreed with Keynesian principles. For a detailed account of various national fiscal responses 
to the GFC see Wanna et al. (2015). On how neoliberal thinkers replied to the resurgence of 
Keynesianism, see Blyth (2013).
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 3 According to Doern et al. (2013), we now live in an age of perpetual budget crisis.
 4 For a detailed account of the Canadian response to the GFC, see Good and Lindquist (2015).
 5 Ontario Premier Wynne launched a three-year pilot project to study the feasibility of a UBI 
program, which was cancelled abruptly by the Ford government.
 6 See Tellier (2005) as well as several studies published in the annual publication How Ottawa 
Spends.
 7 An excellent comparative analysis is provided by the Chaire en fiscalité et finances pub-
liques, Université de Sherbrooke, available here (in French): https://cffp.reche rche.usher 
brooke.ca/outils-resso urces/ outil-de-compa raison-mesur es-covid 19/.
 8 See, for instance, the work of Martin et al. (2009), Leroy (2011) and Mumford (2019). In 
Canada, fiscal sociology has started to be investigated by historians (see Heaman 2017; 
Tillotson 2017).
 9 A third set of factors is also addressed in an expanded version of this article currently under 
review, namely a widened set of digitally-rooted national security threats at least partially 
intertwined with the pandemic.
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